

P O L I C Y C O N S E Q U E N C E S

A STUDY OF THE £5,000 SURRENDER GRANT IN THE DUBLIN HOUSING
AREA

T H R E S H O L D

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F O R E W O R D

It is hardly a radical statement to say that housing policy should take into account social as well as economic considerations. Yet in many cities throughout the world there is insufficient consideration given to the social effects of housing policy and how it contributes to the creation of urban poverty.

Urban poor everywhere share much in common including a feeling of powerlessness; insignificance; frustration and despair; fearfulness of the future; inadequate housing; low health expectation; unemployment; insufficient money; poor provision for education; a higher rate of crime; and political turmoil.

In Ireland we may be spared the extremes so evident in cities like San Paulo, Calcutta etc. But we need not be complacent. A voluntary organisation like THRESHOLD which assists thousands of people annually with housing problems has an obligation to monitor the effects (however small) of legislation and housing policy.

This report is one of many studies undertaken by THRESHOLD over the past number of years. It looks at positive benefits

of the erstwhile £5,000 grant, but also focuses critically on some of the adverse social consequences. By publishing it, THRESHOLD hopes that it will create a greater public awareness of the 'pros' and 'cons' of such grants, as well as offering a modest contribution to future housing policy and legislation.

On March 27th 1987, the Government abolished the £5,000 "Surrender grant" as part of its budget. But this in no way makes the report redundant. In fact, from a social policy point of view, it is now more relevant.

Fr. Donal O'Mahony, O.F.M. Cap. V.F. P.P
Executive Director and Founder of Threshold.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1984 a new variety of housing grant was introduced by the Government. A "surrender grant" of £5,000 was made available to Local Authority tenants and tenant purchasers wishing to buy a house in the private sector. (A synopsis of the scheme is given in Appendix 1.) As time went on, expressions of serious concern over some effects of the grant began to come in to THRESHOLD from community leaders in areas of Dublin where a high response to the grant was taking place. In January 1986, THRESHOLD decided to undertake a study of the consequences of the grant.

The distribution of applicants between the 13 sub-areas into which Dublin is divided for housing administration purposes was first studied. Three areas stood out as having the highest rate of response to the grant. A local survey was mounted in these three areas. Interviews with families living there and with others who had availed of the grant yielded factual evidence as well as information on attitudes to the scheme.

A detailed statistical analysis of information made readily available to us by the Department of the Environment and Dublin Corporation was then carried out in order to study the

effects of the grant on waiting lists and housing allocations.

Finally, from all the information gathered, specific effects on the community could be assessed, implications for home ownership studied, and some conclusions reached on broader questions concerning deficiencies in housing policies.

Short-term initiatives have been a characteristic of the approach to housing by successive governments. The findings of our study illustrate how an initiative, however well intentioned and effective in some directions, when undertaken without the backing of a comprehensive housing policy, can create serious problems that remain when, as in this case, the scheme is abolished.

In 1982, THRESHOLD's report, "Private Rented: The Forgotten Sector", drew attention to the need for an overall housing policy with a clear perception of long-term requirements. Five years later the need is still there and has been further highlighted by the effects of the £5,000 surrender grant.

The United Nations has designated 1987 as International Year of Shelter for the Homeless. The declared goal is "to assist every Government to draw up a national strategy and programme for securing improvements in the shelter and neighbourhoods

for all the poor and disadvantaged by the year 2000". The scale of our housing problems in Ireland is obviously different from those of the Third World, but this in no way exonerates us from dealing with the real needs of those in poor housing or deprived neighbourhoods.

Through this study THRESHOLD aims to make a constructive contribution to that stated goal by pressing the case for a major review of housing policy. The country cannot afford the cost, both social and economic, of housing initiatives without it.

A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT ON THE £5,000 GRANT

1. Response by successive Governments to the problems of homelessness and inadequate housing conditions has been, at best, on an ad hoc basis.
2. Five years ago THRESHOLD, through its study of the considerable inadequacies of the private rented sector, drew attention to the urgency of the need for an overall housing policy. The present study of the effects of the £5,000 surrender grant in the Dublin area further highlights the harmful consequences of short-term 'solutions' when undertaken without the context of a comprehensive housing policy.
3. In the first fourteen months of the grant's existence, seventy-five percent of applicants were concentrated in three Dublin Corporation housing areas. THRESHOLD's study examines the effects this had on those areas, namely Darndale, Ballymun and Tallaght.
4. The grant undoubtedly enabled people who might not otherwise have been able to do so to purchase a house in the private sector. Their exodus, however, had serious consequences in these areas of high take-up of the grant.

Already existing problems were heightened and further ones created.

5. The effects were found in the study to be as follows:
Communities where unemployment was already high suffered the loss of many of those people who had jobs. Income levels dropped and services in the areas deteriorated. Many of the vacant houses were vandalised. The community was substantially deprived of its leaders as they were the ones to move out with the grant. The large number of vacancies enabled the waiting list for Dublin Corporation housing to be reduced. But an already fragmented community now had to encompass the addition of other marginalised groups, such as single homeless people, single-parent families - many of whom were also unemployed - which the Corporation now found it possible to house. The community spirit essential if such problems are to be combatted had taken demoralising punishment. Stigma, particularly in relation to job opportunities, provided a strong motive to change address. The overall effect gave further impetus to those who could do so to move. As the level of unemployed in the community consequently rose further, the circle was completed.

(x)

6. The removal of the grant leaves behind it unresolved problems in these communities which need urgent attention.
7. THRESHOLD recommends in the strongest terms that a comprehensive, well thought through housing policy be formulated and a Green Paper drawn up as a matter of urgency, to be followed by a White Paper. It is THRESHOLD's particular concern that all future government and local authority housing initiatives be undertaken in the context of their social and economic as well as their physical consequences.

CHAPTER ONE: LEVEL OF GRANT APPLICATIONS

This chapter examines the pattern of grant applications received by Dublin Corporation from 2 October 1984 to the end of November 1985. Dublin Corporation's administrative area is sub-divided into 13 smaller areas which provide the geographical framework for this discussion.

The statistics were compiled on a street-by-street basis from Dublin Corporation records. This provided us with an insight into variations in the response to the scheme at local level. We have focussed on the number of applications, rather than on the number of grants paid out, mainly because of easier access to the former data. In any event, in each area, the number of applications does correspond closely with the number of grants paid out over time.

*

Table 1.1 shows that in the fourteen-month period to end of November 1985 over 1800 applications were received from Dublin Corporation tenants. During 1985 alone, 1070 grants were actually paid out. This represents a high level of response for Dublin as a whole, but the impact of the grant has been highly localised. Some 75% of the total applications were

* See Appendix 3 for tables

(2)

confined to three housing sub-areas, namely C (Darndale), D (Ballymun/Poppintree/Santry Avenue), and F (Blanchardstown/Tallaght/Clondalkin). For convenience, area C is referred to as Darndale, area D as Ballymun and F as Tallaght.

In order to appreciate the full extent of this finding, it is necessary to look at the total local authority housing stock for each of the thirteen areas. The housing stock includes tenancy accounts, live tenant purchase and paid off tenant purchase accounts.

Table 1.2. clearly shows that a significant percentage of the population of areas C (Darndale), D (Ballymun) and F (Tallaght) had applied for grants. In particular over 18% in Darndale (area C) had applied. This indicates a very high level of turnover for one sub-area. The possible effects on community structure, housing, social policies in general needed to be looked at.

Overall, the initial level of response within the Dublin area is considered to be high, but of greater significance is the concentration of that response into a small number of sub-areas.

The question arises whether this movement would have occurred

in the absence of this particular incentive. While statistics are not available on the number of local authority tenants moving to the private sector, some broad indication of its extent may be gauged from the available data on casual vacancies.

In the period 1981-1984, prior to the grant scheme being introduced, casual vacancies averaged 2,500 nationally per year, of which 500 were estimated to be dwellings vacated because of movement to the private sector, representing 0.5% of total housing stock. A spot check carried out in late 1984 by the Department of the Environment confirmed this. Separate figures for the Dublin area are not available. However, if we assume that they related to the national average, Table 1.2 shows an increase in the average to 2.4%, with some sub-areas showing figures of between 6 and 18%. This indicates that the large number of tenants moving to the private sector is a new phenomenon resulting from the introduction of the grant.

THEY SAID . . .

"I didn't want to go in the beginning but when all my neighbours left one by one I changed my mind."

"Anyone that's working is leaving."

"It's a great scheme for me but it's unfair to the people left behind. I can understand how people feel."

"A great idea - gives people a chance to live where they want to live rather than where they're told to live."

"When you see the houses wrecked you want to get out."

CHAPTER TWO: LOCAL ATTITUDES TO THE GRANT SCHEME

When the study of the Dublin Corporation records of applications for the £5,000 grant had been completed, it was clear, as we have seen in Chapter 1, that Darndale (area C), Ballymun (area D) and Tallaght (area F) had produced the significantly highest numbers of applicants in the Dublin district. The combined total from these sub-areas amounted to 75% of the total applicants in the Dublin area in those first fourteen months of the scheme's existence.

Why should there be such a heavy concentration of applicants in these areas? The next stage of the study involved a small-scale survey in these three areas. Its purpose was to evaluate local attitudes to the grant and to the area, profiling the respondents in relation to history of local authority tenancy, age, employment.

A district of median grant take-up was selected in each area for the survey. (It was possible to identify these appropriate districts from information gained when compiling, street-by-street totals of applicants for the grant, from the Local Authority housing records supplied by Dublin Corporation.) Darndale (area C) being the smallest, a sample was taken from the whole area - i.e. from each of the five

courts. In Ballymun (area D) a representative section of Poppintree was selected, and the Killinarden area of Tallaght (area F) was chosen.

Ninety-six people were interviewed. Three sub-categories were used:

Category A: Those who had lived in the areas for less than 12 months at date of interview.

Category B: Those who had lived there for longer than 12 months and had not applied for the grant.

Category C: Those from the survey areas who had taken up the grant and moved elsewhere.

Respondents in categories A and B were selected on a numerical basis (e.g. every 10th dwelling). Respondents in category C were found by "trawling" two areas - Greenpark and Clonsaugh. Samples of the three questionnaire forms used are given in Appendix 4. The relocation of the first 200 applicants is charted in Appendix 5.

Of the 96 interviewed, 12 had moved into houses in the survey

areas which had been vacated since the commencement of the grant scheme (category A). Forty nine were non-applicants living there (category B), and 25, originally from the areas, had obtained the grant and moved to private houses (category C). Although these numbers are small, particularly in category A, we feel that, overall, a sufficiently interesting picture emerged to be worth documenting.

1. Employment

It would be natural to assume that only those in employment would avail of the grant. This is borne out by the survey findings. Amongst grant applicants, the unemployment rate was virtually nil. Only three of the 52 adults were described as unemployed. Of the 59 non-applicant households, 28 had no wage-earners, and only about one third of the adults of normal working age were in employment. Amongst those tenants who had moved in since the start of the scheme, the unemployment rate was also high. (See Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, in Appendix 3.)

2. Attitudes related to moving out

Of the 25 who had taken the grant, five had held their previous tenancy for 3-5 years, sixteen for 5-10 years, and four for more than 10 years. As can be seen in Table 2.4, the two most frequently cited reasons for their move were the 'push' factor of wanting to leave the area and move to a "better" one, closely followed by the desire to own their own homes. Interestingly, few of these respondents in category C saw their new area as any better in terms of neighbours, schools or transport facilities. Moreover, the majority did not consider their new house to be of better quality than their local authority house - indeed a large proportion considered it to be worse. Many found that the move had involved them in more expense than they had anticipated. Nevertheless, all but two stated that the move had been worth while for the sake of getting away from their previous address.

Of the 59 non-applicants interviewed (category B), 7 had held their tenancy for 1-3 years, 17 for 3-5 years and 35 for more than 5 years. Thirty-seven of the 59 respondents in this category declared that the area in which they were now living had not been their first choice when applying. Thirty-five (i.e. 60% of respondents in this category) expressed their

wish to leave their present area. Dissatisfaction with the area, and isolation from family and friends were the two reasons most frequently given for wanting to leave (see Table 2.5). The effect of address on their children's future came across at interview as a widely felt concern.

Those in the sample who had moved in recently (category A) numbered only 12, of whom three were in Darndale, four in Ballymun (Poppintree) and five in Tallaght (Killinarden). It is interesting to note that for eight of the twelve the area was not their first choice. Three were already on the transfer list, and five intended to apply for the grant and move out to a private house.

3. Attitudes to the Grant Scheme

Almost all the respondents were aware of the grant scheme. Of the 59 non-applicants, 42 thought it was a good idea because of the opportunity it gave tenants to buy a house of their own. Nineteen said they would have taken the grant if they could. However, 44 felt that it had had a harmful effect on their local community in terms of the break-up of friendships, organisations and community morale, increasing ghettoisation and increasing the proportion of unemployed in

their locality (see Table 2.6). This aspect is of key importance and will be considered in detail in Chapter 4.

4. Attitudes to the area

As we have seen, almost 70% of the non-applicants (category B) stated that the area in which they were living was not their first choice when they had applied for local authority housing. There were signs of local variations between areas. Ballymun (area D) showed a lower percentage - that is, more respondents positively choosing the area (see Table 2.5 again). In general, respondents in this area showed a more positive attitude to their area at interview.

A study of Darndale by Redmond (1985)¹ found that "mobility among the population was high ... and would possibly be greater if circumstances permitted". Furthermore, a survey carried out by the National Economic and Social Council (1981)² found that 60% of residents interviewed in Darndale wished to move. Our own survey also pin-pointed the court system of building as being the focus for much of the dissatisfaction with the area. However, it must also be said that, perhaps as a spin-off effect, Darndale respondents showed the highest involvement in Residents Associations, of

the three areas of our survey (see Table 2.7), and, as television viewers may recently have seen for themselves, are taking positive steps to help themselves as a community.

Some General Findings

The low stability factor found in these three areas is not conducive to the building up of community. Even where community-building efforts have been successful, their foundations are fragile, vulnerable to mobility of the leading lights. It is not surprising that the effect of the £5,000 grant has been momentous. While many on an individual basis approved of the grant and indeed would have liked to obtain it if that were possible, the overwhelming majority felt it had a negative effect on their community. The break-up of the community itself has led to a self-perpetuating circle, with those whose friends and neighbours have left feeling increasingly isolated and finally considering a move themselves.

There has been a tendency to see housing problems such as overcrowding and bad structural conditions as simply matters to be resolved by increasing housing construction. The selective response to the £5,000 Grant Scheme, however,

demonstrates most forcefully the demand there is for choice in housing.

Lack of initial choice, combined with poor design, inadequate services (transport, shops, community centres, etc.) could be expected to contribute actively to creating an unsettled community.

Overall, then, in the explanations given at interview by those who had or would have wished to have availed of the grant, 'push' factors i.e. the desire to leave the area - featured more than 'pull' factors, such as the desire to own a private home. In particular the 'address syndrome' featured strongly, and many felt that they had to move in order to give their children a better chance for the future. Respondents felt that they were discriminated against and stigmatised because of the area from which they came, particularly in relation to employment opportunities.

The overall economic factors were considered important - a salable asset to show for payments, giving at the same time security of tenure. There also emerged a considerable degree of resentment against the differential rents scheme (bigger income/bigger rent for same house as neighbour). This, combined with the 'threatened' re-evaluation of the rents

scheme to include gross pay (overtime earnings, etc.), made a move more attractive.

Many commented that the levels of crime and violence experienced had increased dissatisfaction with the areas. Interestingly enough, drugs were not cited as a major factor.

The design and locality of the housing showed as major 'push' factors. The layout and planning faults in Darndale especially are well documented by Redmond in his analysis of the area. The court system of housing, with its lack of privacy, lack of front gardens, and the somewhat grim appearance of these estates were most often quoted as major causes of dissatisfaction in Darndale (area C) and Poppintree (area D). In Tallaght (area F) the major sources of discontent quoted were isolated and lack of facilities (particularly for the large young population).

In all three areas there was a definite feeling that the area had 'gone down' since the introduction of the grant. Those with jobs had left in large numbers. This in turn strengthened the desire of those who remained to leave also - another 'push' factor being created in the process.

It became increasingly obvious that the grant scheme could

not simply be regarded as a booster for the building industry and a handy device for helping people to fulfil a wish to own their own home. The factors which influenced such a high concentration of applications in three areas are considerably more complex than simply being a response to a tempting offer. The end result is that the grant has exacerbated existing problems in these areas and created new ones. The community spirit necessary to combat such problems is being broken down - as more people leave, more people will want to leave. Thus, the short-term popularity of the scheme can be seen to have created on-going problems. Community factors are essential considerations in any housing plan, yet through lack of an overall policy, they were omitted in the case of the £5,000 grant.

References

1. D.A. Redmond, Darndale: Planning and perception: 1985
2. M.J. Bannon, J.G. Eustace and M. O'Neill: Urbanisation: Problems of Growth and Decay in Dublin, N.E.S.C. Report No.55, Dublin Stationery Office, 1981.

THEY SAID ...

"The scheme is a good idea because not so many are moving in my area. If a few more moved out it would have a bad effect."

"They put more houses in here and there weren't even the facilities for the ones that were here already."

"I'm from the city myself. I hate living out here. There's nothing here. I can't even get to see my family that often. It costs so much."

"I left because I wanted my kids to have a chance."

"I've got no front garden, I can't let the kids out to play. I'm afraid they'll get hurt."

"How can you live looking at a brick wall all your life."

"I wouldn't leave Ballymun, there's more going for it - just a different type of house not in a court."

"When they built this place they forgot about the people in it."

"X is going to be a place for just the unemployed."

"You mention X district and you won't get a job."

- THE IMPACT OF THE GRANT ON HOUSING ALLOCATIONS

One of the major arguments in favour of the grant scheme is that it reduced the pressure on local authority housing lists. This Chapter examines that argument, with reference to changes in the numbers on the Dublin Corporation waiting list and in allocation patterns. In particular, allocations in the three areas of high take-up are considered.

Table 3.1 (see Appendix 3) shows a drop in the number of families on the Dublin Corporation housing list from 1984 on. There was a correspondingly large increase in the numbers of families actually housed by the Corporation from the waiting list. This increase is not simply accounted for by the number of new dwellings becoming available through the Corporation's housing construction programme.

The first impact of the grant would have been felt in the last three months of 1984. The Table shows a substantial drop in the waiting list of 1st November 1984, coupled with a small drop in the number of new dwellings available, and a drop in the number housed. This latter drop could probably

be largely explained by the time-lag in houses actually becoming available for re-letting which were due to be vacated by those taking up the £5,000 grant. The next two years, 1985 and 1986, show a continued decrease in the numbers on the waiting list, a substantial drop in the number of new houses added to the pool, and a considerable increase in the number housed. In addition, the Allocations Branch of the Dublin Corporation Housing Department reports (20 November 1986) that "a number of family applicants eligible to go on the list in November 1986 were actually housed then because of the availability of empty dwellings in areas like Tallaght and Darndale."

Given the decrease in the number of new houses completed, this provides a clear indication that much of the increase in the number housed is a direct result of vacancies created by the grant scheme. Examination of casual (i.e. unexpected) vacancies, adds further to the picture. Figures for casual vacancies (excluding transfers) from 1982 to 1986 supplied by Dublin Corporation show substantial increases in 1985 and 1986 as compared with 1982 and 1983. For example, a comparison of the aggregate of casual vacancies for 1982 and 1983 with 1985 and 1986 shows an overall increase of 202%; while, looking at individual areas, the figures for Darndale increased by 317% and for Tallaght/Blanchardstown by a staggering 1,046%

(145 vacancies to 1,661).

The Allocations Branch of Dublin Corporation Housing Department reported as follows on 22 November 1985: "A factor in the reduction on the Housing list is the increased number of vacant dwellings available arising from the £5,000 Grant scheme. 1,217 dwellings became vacant as a result of this Scheme in the period from the start of the Scheme (October 1984) to July 1985." "The number of new applications received for the November 1985 period was greater than in recent periods so that the reduction in the Housing list total must be attributed to the increased number of vacancies available." In 1986, of the 2,838 casual vacancies, 1,239 arose as a consequence of the £5,000 Grant, the Allocations Branch further reports.

The rules governing housing allocations have to take into account the availability of houses. When only a few are available the rules are rigidly applied, but a flood of vacancies such as happened in these sub-areas enables the rules to be relaxed.

In researching allocations, four sets of housing lists were studied - those for Ballymun Flats (within area D, but taken as a separate entity), Darndale (area C), Ballymun (remainder,

area D), and Tallaght (area F). A sample week was taken in each month between October 1984 and July 1986. This week was randomly selected to avoid any possible bias through choosing the same week in each month during that period. The sample throughout includes both new houses and previously occupied ones allocated in each sample week. It excludes Senior Citizen housing.

(i) Ballymun Flats

Since there has always been a high turnover in these flats, it is difficult to assess exactly what influence the grant has had here. However, the figures in Tables 3.2(A) and (B) do show a clear increase of 22% in the lettings in the period May to November 1985, compared with the previous period (October 1984 to April 1985).

The most interesting changes are in the type of family allocated accommodation. As between the periods October 1984 to April 1985, and December 1985 to July 1986, allocations to single people moved from being one of the smallest groups (7% of lettings in the first period) to being the largest (50%).

in the later period. One-parent families with one child* changed from being the largest group accommodated in the first period (44% of lettings) to 18% in the most recent period, while allocations to couples with 1-2 children reduced from 19% of lettings to 3% over the same period.

This would seem to indicate that policy has changed in the allocation of accommodation in the Ballymun flats, with quite a strong swing away from their use as family accommodation towards their use for single people.

(ii) Tallaght (area F)

The patterns of allocations in this area are of particular interest, as it is the district which experienced the highest take-up of the new housing grant, in the Dublin Corporation area.

Table 3.3(A) shows how the number of houses available in the Tallaght area (F) rose from 4 in the first sample week in October 1984 to reach a peak of 33 in December

* These are not necessarily unmarried mothers, but include widowed parents, deserted wives/husbands.

1985. It was at this point that, for the first time in this area in the period under study, houses were allocated to couples with no children and to single-parent families with one child. In Table 3.3(B) it is seen that from December 1985 to July 1986 lettings to childless couples accounted for 32.8% of the total allocations, and single-parent families with one child made up 8.6%. Over the whole period from October 1984 to July 1986, the largest proportion of allocations (55.8%) went to couples with 1-2 children, but within that time these lettings decreased from 72% in each of the first two periods to 37.9% in the most recent period. However, it should be noted that in the Tallaght (area F) area unlike the picture in the Ballymun flats, the actual numbers allocated to this category stayed reasonably constant, with the proportion dropping as the total lettings increased.

These figures should be read in the context of the criteria laid down in Dublin Corporation's booklet "The Scheme of Priorities for Letting Housing Accommodation". It is stated there (p.5, para.8), for example, that "A childless couple will not be offered a house, except in an exceptional case". By December 1985, grant-created vacancies in the Tallaght area (F) had led to a relaxation of this particular rule, and also of the rule that "Generally, a single parent with one child will be offered a flat only" (p.8, para.25).

(iii) Darndale (area C)

The number of lettings here increased from ten in the sample weeks of the first period to 25 in the most recent. Again, single parents with one child and childless couples were allocated houses as the number of vacancies rose.

(iv) Ballymun (area D, excluding Ballymun Flats)

This district shows an overall increase in the number of lettings but no major changes, and few allocations of houses to smaller family units.

Thus it can be seen that childless couples and single parents with one child have benefited to some extent from the increase in vacancies and resulting policy changes arising from the scheme. Single people represent the most significant category to benefit from the changes in allocation criteria. In 1983, for example, out of 2,535 allocations made by Dublin Corporation only 16 were made to single people. In 1985, out of 3,335 allocations 467 went to single people. A Dublin Corporation official stated that many of the people in this category are men under the age of forty who would have been described as homeless. (It is important to note that "homeless" in this context includes all those who do not fit into

any other specific category). There is therefore some force in the argument that the grant has enabled Local Authorities to house people who might not otherwise be housed. But by grouping people together who are 'disadvantaged' in some way (e.g single "homeless", or single-parent families) there is a considerable risk of "ghettoisation", as we have already seen (Chapter 2) with communities where there is high unemployment.

However, this demand for housing by single people, which has been identified clearly by the NESC (Report: Housing Requirements and Population Change, 1981-91, pp. 55 - 57), raises the question of whether a construction policy which in the main concentrates on family units is becoming less appropriate to housing needs.

Another aspect which must be considered here in relation to all the above categories is the advisability of housing one- or two-person households in houses obviously designed for larger family units. Section 1(1.2) of the Dublin Corporation allocations booklet states that:

"In the allocation of dwellings an effort will be made to make optimum use of the available accommodation: e.g.

by utilising the more commodious dwellings for larger families."

It is essential to achieve the most efficient use of the existing housing stock, which includes ensuring the best possible match between household size and dwelling size. While it is understandable that Dublin Corporation is anxious to have its accommodation occupied as soon as possible once it becomes vacant - particularly in view of the difficulties encountered with vandalism and squatting in vacant dwellings - its current practice of filling vacant family-type dwellings with single or two-person household units has distinct disadvantages.

For those household units, accommodation which is too large is more difficult to manage and has higher maintenance costs. In terms of the proper use of housing stock it would be more beneficial to design units more suited to the needs of those who are to occupy them. Given the nature of local authority lettings, once a Corporation property is let it is difficult to recover, and while in the short term there will be a surplus of houses available as a result of the operation of such a scheme, once this backlog has been processed and the scheme stabilises properties which have been let and are underutilised cannot in practice readily be recovered to

accommodate larger family units.

It is also interesting to note that, the waiting list having been reduced through more existing housing becoming available as a consequence of the £5,000 grant, Dublin Corporation's capital allocation for housing construction in 1986 was down by 27% or £15.6m on the previous year's figure.

As has been previously noted, location plays a significant role in the demand for housing. The reality is that many people are not prepared to live in some of the areas where housing is available: as a result more housing has become available to people in categories which had previously been accorded a lower priority on the housing list. The net effect may be that many families continue to live in sub-standard accommodation rather than accept a transfer to locations where they do not want to live. Dublin Corporation's Housing Allocation Department commented (22.11.85) that "There may be up to 5 or 6 refusals in the case of particular vacancies". In addition, the same section reports (12 January 1987): "The total number of applicants on the Transfer List at November 1986 is 6,769 (Family list - 5,841, Senior Citizens 928). This means we have the extraordinary situation where the number on the transfer list is over 3,000 greater than the Housing List. On the face of

it, it means that 6,769 tenants are not happy with the accommodation they occupy and seek an alternative dwelling." It is clear, then, that a simple reduction in numbers on the housing list is not a real indication that people's housing needs are being met to their satisfaction.

Since the highest take-up of the £5,000 grant in the Dublin Corporation housing area came from low-demand districts, the improvement in the waiting list, as we have seen, carried within it concealed problems. The achievement of a settled community must be the general aim, both for social and economic reasons. Yet those housed in dwellings which are inappropriate to their needs could reasonably be expected to reappear on the transfer list in the near future. The need for real long-term solutions is highlighted.

The Dublin Corporation Housing Construction Section has already provided a mix of types of housing in some new building schemes. We would urge that this become the norm in all local authority housing construction programmes, at the same time taking account of shifts in the pattern of those needing accommodation. This would at the same time provide for a possible choice of location in suitable dwellings, and

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ensure that the neighbourhood would have the normal mix for a healthy supportive community (i.e. young and old, married and single, childless couples, single parents), without any undue imbalance.

THEY SAID ...

"The only reason I've got a house is because people are moving out and buying their own."

"The people moving in - unmarried mothers, deserted wives, couples with no children - we've too many already."

"Such a lot of people moving out and buying places makes the area very unstable. The children find it hard to form relationships with other children."

"I took X because I was desperate to get out of the flat. I had no running water and my baby was sick."

CHAPTER FOUR: EFFECTS ON THE COMMUNITY

During the course of our study the impact of the Grant Scheme on the local community was raised time and time again as being the most serious concern of people on the ground.

Those closely involved in the community are most likely to be the best articulators of change taking place there. The researchers therefore interviewed community leaders, social workers, educationalists, religious leaders and members of the medical profession, amongst other, in order to present as informed and realistic a picture as possible of the perceived effects. The comments made by people living in these communities are quoted throughout the report and add a pungency of their own to what is reported here.

It was the general view of our interviewees that the grant has had a most serious effect on community structure in those areas where ^{the} grant take-up has been greatest, both on the community generally and on individual organisations within it. It was further felt that the community could not respond adequately to the changes which had occurred. Many of those who had moved were identified as community leaders, and their loss threw into crisis organisations which had taken years to

build up. For example, in one of the survey areas the lady who had been in charge of a community play-school had undertaken a two years' training course in child care. When she moved, an adequate replacement would require similar training before being competent to undertake this work (that is supposing someone willing to take this on could be found). Youth groups, drama groups, parent groups and a host of other organisations gave evidence of similar difficulties.

The influx of large numbers of new people into the community has brought separate problems in its wake. Under normal circumstances newcomers can be assimilated into the existing structures of a community with comparative ease, but the magnitude of the movement brought about by the grant has caused considerable divisions and other serious consequences in the community. Boundaries have become hardened, with established tenants closing ranks amongst themselves. Barriers have also arisen between those in the community with no option but to stay and those in a position to leave. The frustration of those who have lost neighbours and good friends lessens their own commitment to the area. Community structures and social services have difficulty coping with the increased demand on their resources. Voluntary organisations, such as the Society of St Vincent de Paul, have noted a change in the type of service required of them

and cannot keep up with demand, particularly that emanating from many newcomers who do not even possess the basic necessities for setting up home.

Unemployment

The single most serious effect, however, centres on unemployment. As has been clearly seen in Chapter 2, those who have jobs are the ones who are most likely to move: those who have no work have no option but to stay. The overall impact of this on a community is immense. Motivation to seek what employment is available is directly affected by norms in the area where an unemployed person lives. Where the majority are unemployed, morale and motivation plummet. The overall level of income drops in the community. Small business and community services in the area cannot be maintained, bringing further losses of employment and amenities. The small extra sources of employment (e.g., babysitting) disappear when there is no one with the income to pay for them. The downward spiral goes on, making it harder and harder for a turn-around to be achieved.

As was pointed out repeatedly, particularly by teachers, the sense of hopelessness brought about by the large-scale unemployment in these areas demolishes the motivation and self-confidence, particularly of young people. They arrive

at a belief that nothing can be changed. The £5,000 Grant Scheme, by taking away from an already vulnerable community those who have leadership qualities and jobs, further aggravates the 'ghettoisation' and in turn adds to the sense of hopelessness and lack of influence already felt within the community.

Security and Vandalism

In addition to the other problems surrounding the £5,000 grant scheme, it has been beset by administrative difficulties. Because of the unexpectedly large response to the scheme, the Corporation has done very well in keeping up with the huge volume of applications. However, both as a result of the numbers of tenancies being vacated and their situation in low-demand areas, there has been a significant time lag in reallocating vacant housing. This has meant that at any given time, particularly during the high point of mid-1985, a large number of local authority properties remained untenanted. For instance, it was reported that one house had been left vacant for seven months before being reallocated.

Because of these delays, and quite apart from the traditional problem associated with squatters, there have been serious difficulties with vandalism which has caused severe security

problems for the Corporation. Over £1m was spent securing vacant property in 1985 alone, and judging by the visible level of destruction observed by our researchers while working on the survey, this has proved grossly inadequate. Destruction ranged from the removal of fittings, doors and bathroom equipment to broken windows, floor boards being torn up and, in some instances, houses being set on fire.

No figure is available for the overall cost of refurbishing the damaged property, but a Corporation spokesman in a newspaper report in April 1986 placed the cost of repairing 22 damaged properties at approximately £30,000. Other estimates from organisations working in these areas have placed the cost significantly higher.

There were many calls both from residents and community leaders in the areas affected for increased security for the vacant properties, but the Corporation argued that the cost of responding to such calls would be prohibitive.

The extent of the vandalism caused severe difficulties for other residents. Many were openly frightened and even, terrified - particularly those in close proximity to vacant dwellings. Local people who attempted to protect vacant property or who informed the Gardai of break-ins were

threatened, in some instances.

Vacant houses were used for cider parties by teenagers, and residents reported disturbances going on until the early mornings. Many have complained that the Gardai were not willing to come when called.

This aspect of the scheme further reinforced the desire of many tenants to leave the affected areas either by means of a transfer or by availing of the grant itself, thereby aggravating the situation further.

In addition, the sight of boarded-up and burnt-out houses made it difficult for the Corporation to find tenants willing to take the properties, and added further to the stigma attached to such areas.

Those incoming tenants who accepted vacant houses which had been vandalised had to move in while the houses were being repaired as the Corporation was understandably reluctant to effect repairs on vacant property. This caused great hardship in some cases, with tenants waiting weeks for basic repairs and maintenance, including water supply and electricity.

In the final analysis, the effect in economic terms of

securing and repairing vacant property, added to the loss of rental income, and aside from the significant social costs attached, must detract from the overall economic effectiveness of the scheme.

What might help? Some views of the people in the areas affected

Some ideas to think about emerged in the course of discussions with people living and working in the areas most affected by the grant take-up, during the course of our survey.

A system of rationing of grant allocations - a quota system per sub-area in given periods of time - was suggested. This was put forward as a means of countering a sudden population change in any one area. A slower rate of change would have less drastic effects on the community and allow newcomers to be more easily integrated, it was felt.

It was widely commented that care needs to be taken to avoid removing the employed out of a community where there is already high unemployment. However, where this has been done, additional resources (both economic and human) should be made available to maintain existing voluntary and other services and to help the community to rebuild itself and develop.

CHAPTER FIVE: HOME OWNERSHIP

In Ireland, home ownership has long been considered the most socially and economically desirable form of tenure, and has been supported by many instruments of government policy over the years. This support has included aids to the construction industry, grants to house purchasers, mortgage subsidies and, specifically in the local authority sector, the tenant purchase schemes and, most recently of course, the £5,000 grant. It is the interplay between tenant purchase and the new £5,000 grant scheme to which we now turn.

The first Corporation sales scheme to tenants was introduced in 1968 and under the first three schemes (i.e. 1968, 1970 and 1972) houses were sold at market value minus the appropriate tenancy discounts, these discounts being calculated on the basis of the number of years of tenancy to a maximum deduction of 30%.

From the 1973 sales scheme onwards, the sale price was calculated by taking the original all-in cost of the house and updating this to present-day values using a C.S.O. 'Value of Money' table. In practically all cases this resulted in a lower price than would be similarly offered under the previous system. In addition, no deposit from the tenant was required

and legal fees and stamp duties were borne by the Corporation under all schemes.

These sales schemes proved very attractive to tenants, particularly due to the discounts offered. Table 5.1 (see Appendix 3) shows the number of houses sold during the years 1969 to 1985.

It appears from the evidence in Table 5.2 that sales schemes have been particularly popular in the older stock of local authority dwellings, with enormously high proportions of the pre-war stock having been sold under these schemes. Indeed, critics of the sales scheme concept point out that some of the best housing stock has been removed from the available letting stock in this way. This could adversely affect the ability of the Local Authorities to carry out their housing function, also leaving the least desirable housing for those already in the weakest position. Undoubtedly, many Corporation estates have been extensively privatised through tenant purchase since the sales schemes were introduced. Tenant purchase may contribute significantly to the stability and settling down process in these estates. It may also increase the differential between those who 'have' and those who 'have not', the marginalised becoming more so.

As is seen from Table 5.1, there has been a considerable drop in the level of tenant purchase in recent years: a number of reasons can be advanced for this. In the first place, fewer tenants are in employment. Secondly, house prices have fallen relative to the Consumer Price Index in recent years - updating of value by C.P.I., which in the 70's gave a boost to sales, may now be doing the opposite. Further, the cost of purchasing newer local authority houses, such as those found in our survey areas, through tenant purchase is unattractive in comparison with purchasing in the lower end of the private market. In addition, the slump in the property market over the past number of years and its attendant effects on house prices has made a move to the private sector more economically viable for many tenants despite the generous tenant purchase discount offered by the sales schemes. The factor of expense was highlighted amongst those questionnaire respondents in our survey (see Chapter 2) who would consider buying out their existing Corporation dwellings. The following are examples of the gross cost to the tenant to purchase a standard house in a selection of areas including those which were surveyed for the purpose of this report:

1986 Sales Scheme (August - December)

Killinarden	£28,937 (3 bed) - £44,251 (4 bed)
Darndale	£23,301 " - £24,914 "
Tulip Court (Darndale)	£31,696 " - £33,584 "

Poppintree	£27,850	"	-	£36,696	"
Seville Place (City Centre)	£41,983	"	-	£46,316	"

In addition, a most serious disadvantage with the tenant purchase schemes is that no account is taken when calculating price of the location of the house or of its potential re-sale value. This is particularly relevant in relation to low-demand housing areas and is a factor which contributes to the lower than average level of tenant purchase in housing areas Darndale (C), Ballymun (D) and Tallaght (D) reported in our survey.

These difficulties with the sales schemes may account for the decision to allow tenant purchasers to benefit from the £5,000 grant scheme. Of those to whom grants were paid in 1985, 11% were tenant purchasers, (see Appendix 5). However, the question arises as to why the very people who are prepared to settle in those areas which experience most instability are given positive encouragement to leave.

Tenant purchase schemes would constitute a full-scale research, project in themselves. The point to be made here, however is that they represent a form of housing initiative which has long-term implications for the community and the Local Authority, as well as for the individual: yet, as in the case

of the £5,000 grant, they have been introduced and superceded on an ad hoc basis, without benefit of a thought-through policy, having clear and comprehensive aims and objectives both in the short and long term.

House Purchase - Financing the Move

The £5,000 grant scheme has provided some stimulus to the building industry and certainly the industry has resonded with vigour to the opportunity afforded. Many firms providing houses in the price range which falls within the means of £5,000 grant applicants have specifically canvassed local authority areas and this has undoubtedly been a factor in explaining why many of those who have purchased new houses have done so in the same developments - namely in Greenpark Clondalkin, Newbury Clonskeagh, Riversdale Clondalkin, Cherrywood Clondalkin, Cherryfield Clonsilla, Monksfield Clondalkin and Woodford Clondalkin, among others.

Some builders have eased the path for would-be purchasers by accepting an advance assignment on paper of the grant, once provisional grant approval has been obtained: the Local Authorities have facilitated this by allowing the grant to be paid care of third parties.

However, as with all situations of this type, there have

been some allegations of abuse. A number of people, albeit small, allege that they were not informed of the real cost of purchasing the house at the time of purchase. They claim to have been told that it would cost no more than the rent being paid on the local authority house. Others claim they were misled into believing that they had to buy a new house to avail of the grant. (Certainly some preference has been shown by grant recipients for houses in older more settled areas; many have bought second-hand houses in older local authority estates which have been privatised over time: see relocation tables in Appendix 5.)

At a national level, 42% of grant recipients have bought new houses and 58% are houses which were previously occupied (see Appendix 6).

Of the total number who obtained £5,000 grants in 1985, 56% (1,092) financed their house purchase through the Housing Finance Agency; 36% (702) through local authority SDA loans, and the remaining 8% (156) through various other sources.

The particular attractiveness of the HFA loans is explained in part because the income ceiling for local authority tenants is higher under HFA than under SDA but, more importantly, the level of repayment under HFA is a % of

income as opposed to fixed repayments over time under SDA. Because of this, HFA loans represent greater security in times when unemployment is high, and for local authority tenants can be clearly identified with the differential rents scheme.

In the course of the preparation of this study there were reports of difficulties with the financing and structure of the HFA, and on 27th May 1986 new measures were announced to put the HFA on a sounder financial footing. Included in this package was a proposal to expand the role of Local Authorities from merely acting on an agency basis for HFA loans to assuming more direct responsibility for the administration of these loans. It is also envisaged that the HFA will eventually take over all funding of local authority loans, including SDA loans.

The issue of bad debts has raised concern in relation to £5,000 grant applicants, both among local authority officials and those directly and indirectly concerned with the communities involved. The view was consistently expressed that many of the grant recipients were unaware of the real costs involved in purchase and that they seriously over-extended themselves financially. It was also felt that a small number, in their wish to obtain the grant, over-stated

their employment situation. Half of those interviewed in our survey (cf. chapter 2) felt that their house purchase had involved heavier expenditure than they had anticipated, although respondents overwhelmingly felt that the expense was worth it.

Private house purchasers under this scheme who fall seriously behind or are unable to continue making repayments on their loans may face particularly serious problems. This is because, while under normal circumstances where such a person would be eligible for housing by the Corporation under Section 4.4 of the Scheme of Priorities for letting housing accommodation, in the case of these purchasers, Memorandum HRT 1 from the Department of the Environment states that they will not thereafter be eligible for housing by a Local Authority.

It is difficult to anticipate at this stage whether or not this policy will be adhered to, or indeed whether it has any legal standing. It cannot be doubted, however, that there will be some recipients of the grant who through indebtedness or other factors, such as marriage break-up, will need assistance with housing in the future, and were this policy to be strictly adhered to, such households could potentially be exposed to very severe hardship.

THEY SAID ...

"Years ago when you lived in a Corporation scheme you never dreamed of buying a house."

"I feel I'm doing better for my children."

"8 months after, my husband is unemployed."

"Should give the money to people to improve the house they have."

"There's no point buying the house out - we'd never be able to resell it."

"New tenancy purchase agreement would be much better. People involved in the area have moved out."

"I know people who've moved and they can't afford it, they're only hanging themselves."

"Why should I pay £20 per week for my house when my next door neighbour pays £2 - it's the same house."

"It's cheaper to buy a house outside than your own house."

"There's a lot of people moving that would have stayed. People keep changing. It isn't a settled area. The £5,000 should be for the people who stay."

"Having all these empty houses leaves a bad impression. People say what's wrong here - why are people moving out?"

CHAPTER SIX: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSION

It seems that the £5,000 grant must have appeared to present a simultaneous answer to a number of problems facing the housing authorities and the Government immediately prior to its introduction. From that viewpoint it appeared as if a single instrument could be used to stimulate an ailing construction industry, free sufficient housing stock to enable Local Authorities to house people who might otherwise still be on the waiting lists, and at the same time enable large numbers of people to buy their own homes.

The result has been such that the scheme has now been discontinued. But its sobering legacy calls for two-fold action, both to tackle the problems created or exacerbated by the grant, and - of prime importance - to tackle the lacuna in the whole field of housing policy.

Had such a comprehensive housing policy existed, the social and community factors could not have been omitted from consideration in the first place.

If, as in the case under study, people are sent to live in an area where they do not wish to live, if facilities in the area (transport, shops, community amenities) are grossly

inadequate, if unemployment figures are already high in the area and are further increased by those moving in, if address carries a stigma inhibiting employment opportunities, if those with jobs, who are leaders in the community, have been offered attractive opportunities to move elsewhere and have done so, who in their wildest dreams could expect a settled community to be the outcome?

A vicious circle has been created in the areas of high take-up of the grant. High unemployment - people with jobs, community leaders leave - provision of services deteriorates - income level drops - more people leave - more unemployed are housed to replace them - the proportion of unemployed in the community is boosted and the circle is complete. Added to these ingredients, are problems of vandalism and squatting in houses left vacant. The allocations to fill the vacancies have produced an artificially high concentration of, for example, single homeless people, single parents, unemployed, where support services were already under considerable strain.

The grant, we maintain, has aggravated existing problems and added new ones in the areas of high take-up.

The views gleaned during our survey by interviewing people who had taken up the grant, people who were left behind, and

people who had moved in as a result of vacancies arising from take-up of the grant, could indicate some clues as to what might contribute to the creation and evolution of a settled community.

Choice of area in which to live is something very personal and extremely important to the individual - and probably something of a nightmare for local authority personnel trying to fill vacancies and keep vacancy/vandalism costs to a minimum. Yet if choice is disregarded a significant potential ingredient of stability is put at risk.

Where there are pockets of marginalised groups rather than a balanced mix, "ghettos" can develop and stigmas grow. Creating a mix will not in itself cure the stigma but will make for a healthier community. If different kinds of dwellings for the full range of types of household could be provided in each local authority sub-area, in roughly the same proportion as indicated by census figures, a beginning could be made on making mix and choice more compatible.

When people state their preference for where they want to live, physical lay-out of the area is important to them. Even more important, as we have seen in our survey, are good transport services, good local amenities, good shops, good

leisure provisions, including a community hall. These should be seen as essential provisions in every local authority housing development.

Involvement of the community in all aspects of the planning (social, economic, as well as physical) can be reliably predicted as a help to engendering a sense of ownership and responsibility regarding the community.

The provision of adequate community facilities, coupled with the provision of training for leaders, is a valuable asset in helping a community to take charge of itself. Once this has happened, stigma has a way of disappearing as if it had never existed. This has happened in such areas as Crumlin and Ballyfermot in the past, and is in the process of happening, hopefully, in Darndale today. It would be too simplistic to attribute this to community-building alone, but its importance must not be ignored.

Good things in housing are possible, but they will not simply happen on their own. The essential provision is a comprehensive, co-ordinated housing policy at Government level, well thought-through across the broad spectrum of housing needs (not forgetting the private rented sector for which THRESHOLD sought such a formulation in its 1982 report).

RECOMMENDATION

This study has put into sharp relief the serious consequences produced by housing initiatives unsupported by an overall housing policy. Housing grant schemes and tenant purchase schemes have advantages and disadvantages. We put forward the recommendation in the strongest terms that a far-seeing, comprehensive Housing Policy be formulated to provide the essential context in which future housing initiatives must first be examined. It is therefore recommended that a White Paper, to be followed by a Green Paper, be drawn up accordingly, and that those involved in housing issues be invited to make submissions and present comments on the consequent draft documents.

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APPENDIX 1

SUMMARY OF THE SCHEME OF THE £5,000 GRANT

Ref: Memorandum HRT (Department of the Environment)

TITLE

Grants for tenants and tenant purchasers of local authority dwellings who build or purchase a private house and surrender their existing dwellings to the Authority which provides them.

AMOUNT OF THE GRANT

The amount of the grant is £5,000, payable in one sum when the applicant has surrendered vacant possession of the dwelling to the local authority and has purchased and occupied the private dwelling.

THOSE ELIGIBLE TO QUALIFY FOR THE GRANT

Those qualifying for the grant are tenants of at least three years' standing, and tenant purchasers who have at least three years' occupancy of a local authority dwelling as tenant and tenant purchaser.

NOTE: The three year-period must be continuous and immediately prior to the date of application.

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PROCEDURE

The grant application should be made by the tenant or tenant purchaser to the Local Authority which provided his local authority dwelling.

OPERATIVE DATE FOR GRANT

The operative date for the grant is 2nd October 1984 - the contract for the purchase of the private house must have been entered into after that date, or where a new house is being built by the tenant, if the foundations were completed on or after that date.

GRANT CONDITIONS TO BE MET BEFORE PAYMENT

The private house must be of a suitable size and standard to cater for the needs of the applicant and his/her household. The local authority dwelling being surrendered must be in a fit and tenable condition and be free from arrears of rent, tenant purchase annuities and other payments due to the Authority. The housing authority must be satisfied that the amount of the grant will be applied towards the building or purchase of the house i.e. the sum total of all grants payable must not exceed the gross cost of the house.

OTHERS ELIGIBLE TO APPLY

Spouses of tenants. However, the grant will not be payable

until the tenant has surrendered vacant possession.

A relative other than a spouse who succeeds to a tenancy will not be eligible to apply for the grant until he or she has fulfilled the three year requirement.

Where the private house is being purchased jointly by the tenant or the tenant's spouse with another person, that other person must have been a bona fide resident with the tenant for a continuous period of at least 12 months immediately prior to the making of the application.

OTHER ENTITLEMENTS

The £5,000 grant payable under the scheme does not affect the entitlement of the applicant to any other new house grant or subsidy.

TENANT PURCHASERS

Tenant purchasers qualifying for the grant are not eligible to receive any special compensation in respect of annuity payments made.


A RECIPIENT OF THE GRANT WILL NOT THEREAFTER BE ELIGIBLE FOR HOUSING BY A LOCAL AUTHORITY

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APPENDIX 2

KEY TO DUBLIN CORPORATION HOUSING AREAS

<u>Code</u>	<u>Area</u>
A	Howth/Baldoyle
B	Kilbarrack, Coolock
C	Darndale
D	Ballymun/Poppintree/Santry Avenue
E	Whitehall, Finglas, Cabra
F	Blanchardstown, Tallaght, Clondalkin
H	Sheriff Street area, Dominick Street, Dorset Street, Ballybough
J	Ballyfermot, Bluebell, Inchicore
K	Crumlin, Walkinstown, Drimnagh
L	James's Street, Newmarket, The Coombe, Dolphin's Barn, Clanbrassil Street
M	Pearse Street, Ringsend, Donnybrook
N	Rathmines/Rathfarnham
P	North West Central/ Church Street Area



Appendix 3

TABLES

Chapter 1: Applications

TABLE 1.1: GRANT APPLICATIONS, DUBLIN CORPORATION HOUSING AREAS, TO 30/11/85

Housing Area *	Number of applications	% of total applications
A	6	.3
B	120	6.7
C	169	9.4
D	286	15.9
E	87	4.8
F	897	49.8
H	39	2.2
J	74	4.1
K	8	.4
L	69	3.8
M	24	1.3
N	11	.6
P	12	.7
Total	1,802	100

*See Appendix 2 for key to Housing Areas.

TABLE 1.2: LOCAL AUTHORITY HOUSING STOCK (INCLUDING TENANT PURCHASERS AND HOUSES BOUGHT OUT BY TENANT PURCHASERS) IN RELATION TO GRANT APPLICATIONS

Housing area	(a) Tenancies	(b) Tenant purchasers	(c) Houses bought outright	Total a+b+c = Local Authority stock	Grant appli- cations as % of total
A	259	550	227	1,036	0.6
B	3,268	5,163	1,614	10,045	1.2
C	848	62	11	921	18.3
D	4,116	229	43	4,388	6.5
E	2,930	5,497	2,291	10,718	0.8
F	7,736	859	119	8,714	10.3
H	5,078	476	352	5,906	0.7
J	2,983	3,736	1,156	7,875	0.9
K	1,881	4,277	4,408	10,566	0.08
L	5,655	708	448	6,811	1.0
M	2,284	240	244	2,768	0.9
N	1,253	1,235	513	3,001	0.4
P	1,355	91	119	1,565	0.8
Total	39,616	23,123	11,545	74,314	

References

1. D. A. Redmond, *Darndale: Planning and Perception*: 1985.
2. M. J. Bannon, J. G. Eustace and M. O'Neill: *Urbanisation: Problems of Growth and Decay in Dublin*, N.E.S.C. Report No. 55, Dublin, Stationery Office, 1981.

Chapter 2: Survey Tables

I Employment Status in the Three Categories.

TABLE 2.1: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF TENANTS WHO MOVED INTO VACATED HOUSES (CATEGORY A)

Of the twenty-three people over sixteen in these twelve households, seven were employed, seven unemployed and nine were described as "at home" (i.e. occupied with household duties).

Employed:	Households with no adults employed	6
	Households with 1 adult employed	6
Unemployed:	Households with no adult unemployed	6
	Households with 1 adult unemployed	5
	Households with 2 adults unemployed	1
"At Home"	Households with no adults "at home"	3
	Households with 1 adult "at home"	9
There were no self-employed or retired people in the sample.		

TABLE 2.2: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF NON-APPLICANTS FOR THE GRANT (CATEGORY B)

The average household size in this category was 5.2, with a total of 139 adults. This table shows employment status by household (59)

Employed:	Households with no adults employed	28
	Households with 1 adult employed	25
	Households with 2 adults employed	4
	Households with 3 adults employed	1
	Households with 4 adults employed	1
	Thus, forty of the one hundred and thirty-nine adults were in employment. Two more were self-employed.	
Unemployed:	Households with no adults unemployed	33
	Households with 1 adult unemployed	14
	Households with 2 adults unemployed	9
	Households with 3 adults unemployed	3
	Total No. Unemployed	41
Four adults were retired. Forty-one were described as "at home", i.e. occupied with household duties		

TABLE 2.3: EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF GRANT APPLICANTS (CATEGORY C)

Average household size in this category was 5, with a total of 52 adults in the 25 households. Table shows employment status by household.

Employed:	Households with no adults employed	2
	Households with 1 adult employed	23
	One person was self-employed.	
	None were retired.	
Unemployed:	Households with no adults unemployed	

II Reasons for wanting to move

TABLE 2.4: APPLICANTS' REASONS FOR WANTING TO MOVE (CATEGORY C)

Main reasons given by the 25 respondents

Wanted to leave area/house	13
Wanted to own home	12
Preferred new location	6
Tenant purchase too expensive	4
Opportunity presented by grant	3
Newer houses seen as better	2
Other	1
(N.B. Some gave more than one preferred reason)	

TABLE 2.5: NON-APPLICANTS' REASONS, BY AREA, FOR WANTING TO MOVE (CATEGORY B)

Main reason given by those wanting to move	DARNDALE (area C) 14 of 19 wanted to move	POPPINTREE (area D) 9 out of 21 wanted to move	TALLAGHT (area F) 12 out of 19 wanted to move	TOTAL 35
"Don't like area"	5		3	8
Want to be near family/ friends		1	7	8
Crime/vandalism	3	1		4
Would prefer "better area"	1	3		4
Would like garden/bigger house	3	2		5
Dislike layout of estate/ house	2	1		3
Other		1	2	3

III Attitudes to the Grant Scheme

TABLE 2.6: COMMENTS OF NON-APPLICANTS (CATEGORY B) ON THE GRANT SCHEME.

These were aggregated from all comments made by the 59 respondents.

"Unsettle the area"	25
"Neighbours and friends gone"	25
"Vacant houses mean more vandalism"	18
"Turns the area into a ghetto"	9
"Encourages people to buy houses they can't afford"	4
"Too many problem families coming in"	4

IV Some indications of attitudes to areas

TABLE 2.7: NON-APPLICANTS' INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL ACTIVITIES, BY AREA

Type of Activity	Darndale (area C) (19 residents)		Poppintree (area D) (21 residents)		Tallaght (area F) (19 residents)	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
	12	7	2	19	1	18
					5	14

Chapter 3: The Waiting List

TABLE 3.1: THE WAITING LIST AND HOUSING IN THE DUBLIN CORPORATION AREA

Year	Family Waiting List on 1 Nov.*	Increase or decr. from previous year	New Dwellings	Increase or decr. from previous year	Lettings: Number housed from Family Waiting List, excluding Senior Citizens	Increase or decrease from previous year
1978	4,845		1,386		2,188	
1979	4,961	+116	1,505	+119	2,004	-184
1980	5,135	+174	1,519	+ 14	2,259	+255
1981	5,523	+388	1,520	+ 1	2,539	+280
1982	5,120	-403	1,351	-169	2,185	-354
1983	5,420	+300	1,753	+402	2,860	+675
1984	3,921	-1,499	1,717	- 36	2,725	-135
1985	3,648	-273	1,358	-359	3,335	+610
1986	3,016	-632	1,037	-321	3,704	+369

*This is the number on the waiting list on one day in the year. The number fluctuates from day to day and therefore has not any absolute relationship to the number of lettings in a full year.

TABLE 3.2(A): BALLYMUN FLATS - LETTINGS BY FAMILY TYPE BY SAMPLE WEEK PER MONTH, OCTOBER 1984 TO JULY 1986.

Month ¹	Total	Single	One Parent	One Parent 2+	Couple	Couple 1 - 2	Couple 3+	Other
October 1984	8	1	4	—	1	2	—	—
November 1984	15	—	6	2	4	2	1	—
December 1984 ²	20	1	13	1	1	2	1	—
January 1985	16	2	7	1	1	3	—	3
February 1985	25	1	11	2	4	7	—	—
March 1985	25	3	11	2	3	4	—	2
April 1985	29	2	9	3	7	6	2	—
May 1985	29	6	9	4	3	5	1	1
June 1985	29	6	10	1	8	3	—	1
July 1985	26	1	13	2	4	6	—	—
August 1985	14	3	4	4	3	—	—	—
September 1985	23	9	2	1	9	2	—	—
October 1985	31	8	5	1	11	4	2	—
November 1985	25	11	2	2	7	2	—	1
December 1985	24	17	2	—	3	1	—	1
January 1986	29	13	4	2	5	2	1	2
February 1986	26	13	5	1	5	—	1	1
March 1986	14	5	2	1	5	—	—	1
April 1986	23	11	6	2	4	—	—	—
May 1986 ³	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
June 1986	6	2	3	—	—	1	—	—
July 1986	14	7	3	—	3	—	1	—
Totals	451	122	131	32	91	52	10	13

TABLE 3.2(B): BALLYMUN FLATS - LETTING BY FAMILY TYPE, WITH PERCENTAGES, OCTOBER 1984 TO JULY 1986, IN THREE PERIODS

Family Type	Oct. '84 - Apr. '85		May '85 - Nov. '85		Dec. '85 - July '86		Totals	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Single	10	(7.2)	44	(24.9)	68	(50.0)	122	(27.1)
One Parent Family, 1 child	61	(44.2)	45	(25.4)	25	(18.4)	131	(29.0)
One Parent, 2+ children	11	(7.9)	15	(8.5)	6	(4.4)	32	(7.1)
Couple, no children	21	(15.2)	45	(25.4)	25	(18.4)	91	(20.2)
Couple, 1-2 children	26	(18.8)	22	(12.4)	4	(2.9)	52	(11.5)
Couple, 3 or more children	4	(2.9)	3	(1.7)	3	(2.2)	10	(2.2)
Other	5	(3.6)	3	(1.7)	5	(3.7)	13	(2.9)
Total	138	(100)	177	(100)	136	(100)	451	(100)

TABLE 3.3(A): TALLAGHT (AREA F) - LETTINGS BY FAMILY TYPE BY SAMPLE WEEK PER MONTH, OCTOBER 1984 TO JULY 1986.

Month ¹	Total	Single	One Parent	One Parent 2+	Couple	Couple 1-2	Couple 3+	Other
October 1984	4	—	—	1	—	2	—	1
November 1984	14	—	—	2	—	6	4	2
December 1984 ²	23	—	—	1	—	20	2	—
January 1985	12	—	—	—	—	9	1	2
February 1985	18	—	—	1	—	11	5	1
March 1985	18	—	—	—	—	15	2	1
April 1985	18	—	—	2	—	15	1	—
May 1985	23	—	—	2	—	16	3	2
June 1985	13	—	—	2	—	10	—	1
July 1985	11	—	—	4	—	5	1	1
August 1985	13	—	—	2	—	9	2	—
September 1985	6	—	—	—	—	5	—	1
October 1985	6	—	—	2	—	4	—	—
November 1985	9	—	—	—	—	9	—	—
December 1985	33	—	1	5	13	12	2	—
January 1986	25	—	1	3	9	9	3	—
February 1986	20	—	—	—	6	12	1	1
March 1986	16	—	—	1	4	9	—	2
April 1986	28	—	5	2	10	10	1	—
May 1986 ³	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
June 1986	19	—	4	2	2	8	3	—
July 1986	33	—	4	6	13	6	2	2
Totals	362	—	15	38	57	202	33	17

TABLE 3.3(B): TALLAGHT - LETTINGS BY FAMILY TYPE, WITH PERCENTAGES, OCTOBER 1984 TO JULY 1986, IN THREE PERIODS

Family Type	Oct. '84 - Apr. '85		May '85 - Nov. '85		Dec. '85 - July '86		Totals	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Single	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
One Parent Family, 1 child	—	—	—	—	15	(8.6)	15	(4.1)
One Parent, 2+ children	7	(6.5)	12	(14.8)	19	(10.9)	38	(10.5)
Couple, no children	—	—	—	—	57	(32.8)	57	(15.7)
Couple, 1-2 children	78	(72.9)	58	(71.6)	66	(37.9)	202	(55.8)
Couple, 3 or more children	15	(14.0)	6	(7.4)	12	(6.9)	33	(9.1)
Other	7	(6.5)	5	(6.2)	5	(2.9)	17	(4.7)
Total	107		81		174		362	

TABLE 3.4: DARNDALÉ (AREA C) - LETTINGS BY FAMILY TYPE, BY SAMPLE WEEK PER MONTH, WITH PERCENTAGES, OCTOBER 1984 TO JULY 1986, IN THREE PERIODS

Family Type	Oct. '84 - Apr. '85		May '85 - Nov. '85		Dec. '85 - July '86		Totals	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Single	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
One Parent Family, 1 child	—	—	3	(30)	9	(36)	12	(25.5)
One Parent, 2+ children	3	(25.0)	3	(30)	2	(8)	8	(17.0)
Couple, no children	—	—	1	(10)	5	(20)	6	(12.8)
Couple, 1-2 children	8	(66.7)	3	(30)	9	(36)	20	(42.6)
Couple, 3 or more children	1	(8.3)	—	—	—	—	1	(2.1)
Other	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total	12		10		25		47	

TABLE 3.5: BALLYMUN (EXCLUDING BALLYMUN FLATS) (AREA D) - LETTINGS BY FAMILY TYPE, BY SAMPLE WEEK PER MONTH, WITH PERCENTAGES, OCTOBER 1984 TO JULY 1986, IN THREE PERIODS

Family Type	Oct. '84 - Apr. '85		May '85 - Nov. '85		Dec. '85 - July '86		Totals	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Single	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
One Parent Family, 1 child	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
One Parent, 2+ children	—	—	1	(10)	1	(12.5)	2	(9.1)
Couple, no children	—	—	1	(10)	—	—	1	(4.5)
Couple, 1-2 children	3	(75)	6	(60)	6	(75.0)	15	(68.2)
Couple, 3 or more children	1	(25)	1	(10)	1	(12.5)	3	(13.6)
Other	—	—	1	(10)	—	—	1	(4.5)
Total	4		10		8		22	

Chapter 5: Dublin Corporation Housing Sales

TABLE 5.1: HOUSES SOLD UNDER SALES SCHEMES (DUBLIN CORPORATION)

Year	Houses sold
1968/9	1,993
1970	1,490
1971	1,915
1972	1,958
1973	1,093
1974	3,118
1975	3,972
1976	4,780
1977	1,412
1978	654
1979	838
1980	1,225
1981	1,649
1982	1,309
1983	1,337
1984	1,025
1985	725
Total	30,493

TABLE 5.2: DUBLIN CORPORATION HOUSING SALES BY VINTAGE

Year Built	No. of Houses Built	No. of Houses Sold at 31/12/85	% of Houses Sold at 31/12/85
Pre 1940	11,174	9,488	84.9%
1940 - 1949	8,339	6,970	83.6%
1950 - 1959	9,127	7,286	79.8%
1960 - 1969	3,392	2,489	73.4%
1970 - 1979	11,337	4,215	37.2%
1980 - 1985	10,000 (approx.)	45	0.45% (approx.)
Total	53,369 (approx.)	30,493	57.1% (approx.)

APPENDIX 4(A)

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FORMS

THRESHOLD: Voluntary Housing Advice and Research Service

£5,000 GRANT SURVEY

CATEGORY A: Those who had lived in the area for less than 12
months at the date of interview

AREA:

ADDRESS OF RESIDENCE:

1. No. of persons in the Household:

2. Age Profile No. of Persons

Under 5 years	24 to 39 years
5 to 10 years	39 to 50 years
10 to 16 years	50 to 65 years
16 to 24 years	over 65 years

3. How long have you been a tenant in this house/flat?

(a) Less than 1 year

(b) More than 1 year but less than 3 years

(c) From 3 to 5 years

(d) More than 5 years

4. Where did you live prior to moving here?

5. Did you live

(a) With Parents

(b) In Private Rented

(c) In hostel or other form of temporary accomodation

(d) In local authority house/flat

(e) Other - please specify

6. Do you regard the quality of this house/flat as better
than your previous accommodation? Yes/No

7(a) Do you regard this as a permanent home? Yes/No

(b) Are you on a transfer list?

Do you plan to buy a private house?

Other - Please specify

8(a) In applying for your tenancy was this your area of first
choice Yes/No

(b) If no, please state area of preferred choice..... ,

(c) Reason for preference.....

9. What is your opinion of this area in terms of

Very Good Good Fair Bad

Educational Facilities

Leisure Facilities

Transport Facilities

Shops, Post Office etc

Good Neighbours

Statutory Services

10. Do you consider there are any problems with this area

A Serious
Problem

A Problem

Not really
a Problem

(a) Crime

(b) Vandalism

(c) Drugs

11. Are you, or any of your family, involved in any of the following local community activities:

Residents/Tenants Association

Sports Clubs etc.

Local School Committees

Church Activities

Youth Clubs

Political Organisations

Voluntary Organisations

Organisations dealing with local issues

12. Employment status of adults in the household:

	No. of Persons
Employed
Self Employed
Unemployed
Retired
At Home

13. Marital status of head of household:

Single	Married	Widowed	Separated
Other			

14. Any other comments:

.....

.....

.....

INTERVIEWER

DATE

APPENDIX 4 (B)

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FORMS

THRESHOLD: Voluntary Housing Advice and Research Service

£5,000 GRANT SCHEME

CATEGORY B: Those who had lived in the area for longer than
12 months at the date of interview

AREA:

ADDRESS OF RESIDENCE:

1. No. of persons in the Household:

2. Age Profile No. of Persons

Under 5 years	24 to 39 years
5 to 10 years	39 to 50 years
10 to 16 years	50 to 65 years

3. How long have you been a local authority tenant/tenant
purchaser in this house?

- (1) Less than 1 year
- (2) More than 1 year but less than 3 years
- (3) 3 to 5 years
- (4) More than 5 years

4. Where did you live prior to moving here?

5. Did you live:

(a) With parents

(b) In Private Rented

(c) In hostel or other form of temporary accommodation

(d) In local authority house/flat

(e) Other - please specify

If (d), please specify

6. Are any other members of you family local authority tenants?

Parents

Brothers/Sisters

Sons/Daughters

7(a) Did you apply for this tenancy yourself?

(b) Did you succeed to it on the death of a relative?

-If 7(a), was this area your first choice? Yes/No

If no, ask:

8(a) What was your preferred location? Area

(b) Reason for preferred location

(1) close to family and relatives

(2) better facilities

(3) other

9. How would you rate this area in terms of the following
- | | Very Good | Good | Fair | Bad |
|--|-----------|------|------|-----|
|--|-----------|------|------|-----|

Educational Facilities

Leisure Facilities

Transport Facilities

Shops, Post Office etc.

Statutory Services

Social Workers, Clinics etc.

10. Do you consider there are any problems in this area relating to:

A serious
Problem

A Problem

Not really a
Problem

(a) Crime

(b) Vandalism

(c) Drugs

11. Are you, or any of your family, involved in any of the following local community activities:

Residents/Tenants Association

Sports Clubs etc.

Local School Committees

Church Activities

Voluntary Organisations

Youth Clubs

Organisations dealing with local issues

12. Are you aware of the £5,000 grant scheme to encourage local authority tenants to move to private houses?

Yes

No

13. Do you consider that it is a good idea?

Yes

No

14. Do you feel that it has had an effect on your community?

Yes

No

15. (if 'yes' to Q.14) please state in what way it has affected your local community.

.....
.....
.....

16(a) Have you considered moving from this area yourself?

Yes

No

16(b) If yes,

(1) Would you consider taking advantage of the grant to buy a private house? Yes/No

.....
.....

(2) Would you apply for a transfer? Yes/No

17. Preferred location of new house

18. Please state reasons why you would like to move:

(1) You are dissatisfied with your current area because
of:

Educational Facilities

Leisure Facilities

Transport Facilities

Shops, Post Offices etc.

Statutory Services

Levels of Crime and Vandalism

(2) You would like to be closer to your family, friends
and relations.

(3) You would prefer to own a private house.

(4) Other - Please specify

If 'no' under question 16 (a), then ask question 19

19. Would you consider buying out your present house under a
tenant purchase scheme? Yes/No (c.f. Q.3)

If 'No' state reason
.....

(75)

20. Employment status of adults in the household:

	No. of Persons
Employed
Self Employed
Unemployed
Retired
At Home

21. Marital status of head of household:

Single	Married	Widowed	Separated
--------	---------	---------	-----------

Other

22. Any other comments:

.....
.....
.....
.....

INTERVIEWER

DATE

APPENDIX 4 (C)

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

THRESHOLD: Voluntary Housing Advice and Research Service

£5,000 GRANT SURVEY

CATEGORY C: Those who had bought houses on the private market

AREA FROM WHICH TENANT ORIGINATED:

ADDRESS OF PREVIOUS RESIDENCE:

ADDRESS OF CURRENT RESIDENCE:

1. No. of persons in the household:

2. Age Profile No of persons

Under 5 years	24 to 39 years
5 to 10 years	39 to 50 years
10 to 16 years	50 to 65 years
16 to 24 years	over 65 years

3. How long have you been living in this house?

4. Prior to moving here, how long were you a local authority tenant?

- (a) Less than 3 years
- (b) 3 to 5 years
- (c) 5 to 10 years
- (d) More than 10 years

5(a) When you applied for the tenancy, was the area you were living in your first choice? Yes/No

(b) If 'No', please state area of first choice

(c) Reason for choice:

- (1) Close to family and friends
- (2) Better facilities
- (3) Other

6. Are any other members of your family local authority tenants? Parents Brothers/Sister Sons/Daughters

7. Reason for deciding to buy a private house:

- (a) You would prefer to own your own house
- (b) You think it is better value for money
- (c) You prefer the location
- (d) Other - please specify

8. Please rate your old and new neighbourhood under the following headings giving points from 1 to 10

	OLD	NEW
	1 - 10	1 - 10
Schools
Leisure Facilities
Good Public Transport
Shops etc.
Distance for Schools/ Work
Good Neighbours
Health Facilities
Lack of Crime/ Vandalism

9. Were/are you or any of your family involved in any of the following activities in both your new and your old neighbourhood?

	OLD	NEW
Residents/Tenants Associations		
Sports Clubs		
Local School Committees		
Local Church Activities		
Voluntary Organisations, eg. St Vincent de Paul		
Youth Clubs		

OLD

NEW

Political Organisations

Organisations dealing with
local issues

Other

10. Would you have considered buying a private house if the
£5,000 grant scheme had not been involved? Yes/No
If 'No' please state reason
.....
11. Did you experience any of the following difficulties in
getting the grant?
Finding the scheme hard to understand?
Too much paperwork?
Long delays?
Local authority officials unhelpful?
12. Would you feel the quality of your new house is:
Better than your old one
Worse than your old one
Much the same
13. Have you found the extra expense more difficult to cope
with than you expected Yes/No
Comments

14. Employment status of adults in the household:

	No. of persons
Employed
Self Employed
Unemployed
Retired
At home

15. Marital status of head of household:

Single	Married	Widowed	Separated
--------	---------	---------	-----------

Other

16. Any other comments:

.....

.....

INTERVIEWER

DATE

APPENDIX 5

RELOCATION PATTERNS

This Appendix follows up the first 200 household applicants for the £5,000 grant. A more thorough study was not possible because of the difficulty in acquiring the necessary information.

TABLE 2.8: WHERE THE FIRST 200 APPLICANTS LIVED BEFORE TAKING UP THE GRANT

TALLAGHT	40
BLANCHARDSTOWN	34
BALLYMUN	31
DARNDALE	19
CLONDALKIN	17
INNER CITY	16
FINGLAS	15
COOLOCK	10
OTHER	18
TOTAL	200

The following table shows where the applicants moved to. The shift is separately noted for each of the areas in the above table. It should be noted that some people moved house within their own area:

TABLE 2.9: RELOCATION OF FIRST 200 APPLICANTS, BY AREA OF
PREVIOUS HOME

TALLAGHT

Total Households: 40

16 moved to Clondalkin
 7 moved to Tallaght
 3 moved to Drimnagh
 2 moved to Crumlin
 1 moved each to Kilkenny
 Kildare
 Cavan
 Leixlip
 Rialto
 Donabate
 Finglas
 Phibsboro
 Ballyfermot
 Clonsilla
 Ballymount
 Raheny

BLANCHARDSTOWN

Total Households: 34

20 moved to Clonsilla
 4 moved to Castleknock
 2 moved to Blanchardstown
 2 moved to Ashbourne
 1 moved each to Leixlip
 Navan Road
 Donabate
 Mulhuddart
 Celbridge
 Kilmainham

TABLE 2.9: Relocation of first 200 applicants, by area of previous home, continued

BALLYMUN

Total Households: 31

8 moved to Clonsilla
 4 moved to Glasnevin
 3 moved to Ballymun
 3 moved to Swords
 2 moved to Ashbourne
 2 moved to Finglas
 1 moved each to
 Tallaght
 Drimnagh
 Coolock
 Artane
 Kilbarrack
 Santry
 Balbriggan
 Malahide
 Leixlip

DARNDALE

Total Households: 19

4 moved to Coolock
 2 moved to Donabate
 2 moved to Raheny
 1 moved each to
 Clonsilla
 Artane
 Dublin 7
 Cabra
 Clonshaugh
 Clondalkin
 Donahies
 Donaghmede
 Crumlin
 Santry
 Lusk

CLONDALKIN

Total Households: 17

8 moved to Clondalkin
 3 moved to Tallaght
 1 moved each to
 Lucan
 Newbridge
 Raheny
 Walkinstown
 Ringsend
 Drimnagh

INNER CITY

Total Households: 16

3 moved to Clondalkin
 2 moved to Cabra
 1 moved each to
 Montpellier
 Drimnagh
 Glasnevin
 Marino
 Crumlin
 Dublin 5
 North Strand
 Dun Laoghaire
 Castleknock
 Whitehall
 Donnycarney

Contd/

TABLE 2.9 Contd

FINGLAS

Total Households: 15

5 moved to Clondalkin
 2 moved to Clonsilla
 1 moved each to
 Donabate
 Castleknock
 Glasnevin
 Inchicore
 Whitehall
 Ashbourne
 Finglas
 North Circular Road

COOLOCK

Total Households: 10

4 moved to Coolock
 2 moved to Clonshaugh
 2 moved to Clonsilla
 1 moved each to
 Cabra
 Phibsboro

OTHER

Total Households: 18

3 moved to Clonsilla
 3 moved to Clondalkin
 1 moved each to
 Raheny
 Glenageary
 Ballyfermot
 Dublin 5
 Dundrum
 Whitehall
 Inchicore
 Palmerstown
 Swords
 Kilnamanagh
 Kinsealy
 Baldoyle

TABLE 2.10: TRENDS IN ARRIVALS (FIRST 200 APPLICANTS)

Numbers to:	Clonsilla	37
	Clondalkin	36
	Tallaght	11
	Coolock	9
	Castleknock	6
	Glasnevin	6
	Drimnagh	6
	Ashbourne	5
	Donabate	5
	Raheny	5
	Crumlin	4
	Finglas	4
	Cabra	4
	Swords	4
		—
	Other areas	58
		—
		200

APPENDIX 6

PURCHASE DATA RE THE GRANTS PAID NATIONALLY UNDER THE
£5,000 SURRENDER GRANT IN 1985

Total number of £5,000 Surrender Grants paid in 1985 1,950

of these, 819 were for new houses (42%)

1,131 for previously occupied houses (58%)

and 214 were already tenant purchasers (11%)

1,736 were tenants (89%)

Funding for purchase was distributed thus:

702 by S.D.A. (36%)

1,092 by H.F.A. (56%)

156 by other means (8%)